The electronic limit-order trading system have been sweeping the exchanges around the globe since last decade. This paper studies a case of the transition, which is a group of less-liquid stocks moving to SETS on the London Stock Exchange. The evidence reveals that the liquidity of those stocks substantially drops after the move.
Introduction
Limit-order, continuous auction trading on computerized systems has become very popular following the advances of information technology. Since 1990, many exchanges have moved from batch auctions or dealership system to screen trading. The most dramatic episode took place in MATIF, the French derivative exchange. When the computerized system opened in 1998 in parallel with the trading floor, the trading volumes of the later vanished within two weeks. Although the scenes elsewhere may not be that extreme, it appears that screen system enhances market liquidity by reducing execution costs and increasing trading volumes (Pirrong 1996; Domowitz 2002) .
Furthermore, hybrid markets where a limit-order book system and dealers co-exist, has been shown to enjoy the lowest effective spreads among the equity exchanges in the world (Westerholm and Swan 2003) .
This paper contributes to the discussion of market design by showing that the limit order system, or even the hybrid market, does not prevail universally. The evidence presented here will show that less liquid securities may suffer from the introduction of the order book. There are two reasons for the previous studies to overemphasize the advantages of the screen trading system too quickly. First, previous studies focus on liquid securities and overlook the possibility that less liquid securities may not perform well in a screen system. Second, liquidity across securities is correlated and changes over time (Chordia et al. 2000; Chordia et al. 2001 ). Many incidences, including the switch of trading system, may affect the change of liquidity. For example, previous studies use the data in 1990s, when many events, such as financial market liberalization, the increase in market participation, and changes in trading regulations regarding trade transparency, minimum tick sizes, etc., may all play important roles in enhancing the quality of the financial markets. Without proper controlling for the confounding effects, one may wrongly conclude that the computerized limit order is the only or the main factor to improve the market quality.
This paper provides a counter example against the case of limit-order system. The example took place in 6 September, 1999, when the London Stock Exchange move some not-so-liquid stocks from a pure dealership market to one with dealers as well as a computerized limit order book. The move provides an excellent opportunity to observe how the less liquid stocks respond to the change in trading mechanism. There are stocks remaining in the dealership market and the hybrid market so that they can be used as control groups to compare and contrast with those stocks which made the move. To sum up the findings, the liquidity of those which move to the hybrid market became worse.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the theories and the empirical evidence regarding the comparison of trading mechanisms. Section 3 reviews the trading mechanisms on the London Stock Exchange and the related literature. Section 4 describes the procedure of sample selection. A graphical, exploratory analysis is in Section 5. Section 6 presents comparative and regression analysis and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Literature

Theory
There are a lot of papers comparing different trading mechanisms. Pagano and Röell (1992) explore the theoretical difference between auction markets and dealership markets. They suggest that auction markets offer cheaper service on average, and dealership markets eliminate execution costs. Moreover, traders who are able to identify themselves as uniformed may get better deal in dealership markets. Pagano and Röell (1996) further prove that the dealership market is more expensive to trade than an auction system in all trade sizes, and they attribute this cost difference to the difference in the trade transparency between the two market structures.
Madhavan (1992) also compare the trading mechanism between dealers and continuous auctions. He finds continuous auction is more robust to information asymmetry than a dealership system, but the prices in the auction system are not efficient and more volatile. Glosten (1994) further argues that the limit order book system will prevail if all the trades are anonymous. When trades are not anonymous, Naik et al. (1999) argue that traders may obtain better deals by sharing information with market makers. Another drawback of a dealership market is that market makers may collude (Dutta and Madhavan 1997) , but Bagliano et al. (2000) show that large trades prefer to go to dealership markets to reduce execution costs.
What happens when there are different trading mechanisms in the same market? Biais (1993) offers part of the answer by showing that the expected spread is the same in a fragmented dealer market and a centralized market, but the spread is more volatile in the former. Viswanathan and Wang (2002) argue that a risk-neutral investor prefers to trade in a limit order book and a risk-averse investor prefers a dealership market. When there is a hybrid market, it is preferred to a dealership market.
To sum up, the theoretical literature advocates a hybrid market as dealers and auctions have their own advantages. The prediction that big trades may go to dealers in a hybrid market is consistent with the stylized fact in 1990s that large institutional trades concentrate on London's SEAQ-International while retail trades are executed in Continental European auction markets. Little has been said about the liquidity of the security may affect the choice of venue on which it is traded. However, Easley et al. (1996) suggest that information asymmetry is a more serious problem in less liquid securities than liquid one. Since limit order traders essentially provide the market with free options (Copeland and Galai 1983) , they have to widen the spread. Therefore, Easley et al. do not think limit order trading suits less liquid securities well.
Empirical work
Early studies on the comparison of trading mechanisms typically compare the performance of a group of securities in one market with another group of security in the other market (Neal 1992; Huang and Stoll 1996) . Later on, Christie and Huang (1994) , Barclay (1997) , and Barclay et al. (1998) studies the stocks switching among NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. Their focus is on the competitiveness of market makers on Nasdaq following the controversy of even-eighth quotes Christie, Harris, and Schultz 1994; Christie and Schultz 1999) . They suggest that a dealership market (Nasdaq) is generally more costly than a hybrid, specialist-auction market (NYSE). Incidentally, the conclusion of this paper reaches the opposite direction.
Other studies of market mechanisms play less attention to the alleged misconduct of dealers. De Jong, Nijman, and Röell (1995) compare the trading costs in Paris Bourse, an auction market, and London SEAQ-International, a dealer market, and they conclude that the trading costs of the former is greater than the latter while the depth is deeper in the latter. Degryse (1999) compares the cost of trading Belgian shares in Brussels' CATS and on the SEAQ-International. The inside spread of CATS is tighter than of SEAQ, but SEAQ is a deeper market than CATS. The variation of bid-ask spread is smaller in SEAQ, which is consistent with the theoretical results of Biais (1993) . Griffiths et al. (1997) studies the switch of Toronto Stock Exchange from floor to screen trading and they do not find the switch affects liquidity.
There are relatively few papers discussing the liquidity of less liquid stocks in different trading mechanism. Degryse (1999) investigates the non-crosslisted shares to compare with the cross-listed stocks. He finds the former are less frequently traded with larger spreads and a thin limit order book. Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins (2000) find moving from calls to continuous auctions on the Riga Stock Exchange increases the turnovers of most liquid stocks and depress the other ones. Lauterbach (2001) finds the majority of stocks moving from continuous to call auctions in Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange suffer a drop in liquidity, whereas there is a small group improving it. Theissen (2002) compares screen and floor system in Deutsch Börse. Although his sample consists of 30 most traded stocks, he finds the floor offers more competitive spreads than screen in relatively less liquid stocks. He concludes that illiquid stocks are better traded in floor systems. Finally, Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) report that moving from a pure limit-order system to a hybrid system with a specialist increases the liquidity of thinly traded stocks in Italian Stock Exchange.
The above empirical work by and large expose the difficulty of limit order system. However, they are not quite the same as the market in London. As will be mentioned in Section 3, the new system in London is a hybrid market with a computerized limit order book and a dealer network. Unlike the Italian market, there are multiple dealers. Unlike the German market, the dealers do not trade on the same floor; they trade with one another via telephones. Most importantly, the paper will show that the hybrid setup is not so brilliant that the liquidity drops after the sample stocks move from a pure dealership system to a hybrid one.
Institution
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) introduced Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service (SETS), a limit-order trading system, on 20 October 1997 for FTSE-100 stocks, and there are no longer market makers quoting two-way firm prices for those stocks. The market reform was yet another victory of electronic trading systems in the 1990's, allegedly under the pressure of (the U.S.) security houses and pension funds which eagerly sought the opportunities to cut costs. A limit-order book system, they believed, would allow them to save the spreads although it would take longer time to execute the trades.
Before the reform, market makers posted two-way quotes on the screen of Stock Exchange Automated Quotation System (SEAQ) and received orders from either the computer system or the phones. In addition, market makers may trade with one another either directly or through inter-dealer brokers (IDB, see Reiss and Werner 1998). After SETS has been introduced, the obligations of the former market makers were removed and the IDB market is closed for SETS stocks. Note that the dealer network still exists for the SETS stocks except that dealers are not obliged to quote. Thus, FTSE-100 stocks are essentially traded in a hybrid market with both the limit order book and the dealers.
SETS firstly included only FTSE-100 stocks, and later the Exchange allowed more stocks to trade in the system, including the stocks which become FTSE-100 constituents, those which are on the FTSE-100reserve list, and those which have individual equity options traded on London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). Moreover, those which were dropped from FTSE-100 list after October 1997 would keep trading on SETS.
The Exchange had been considering expanding the realm of SETS, and it began evaluating the possibility of introducing some less-liquid, FTSE-250 securities to trade on the limit order book in early 1999.
1 A list of securities was announce on 6 August 2 and finalized on 27 August 3 , and the 47 securities started trading in SETS on 6 September. The batch of securities entering SETS creates an excellent opportunity to study the change of liquidity when the trading mechanism of less liquid stocks changes.
A number of papers have studied the trading in SEAQ. They focus on the behavior of market makers (Hansch and Neuberger 1995; Reiss and Werner 1996; Hansch et al. 1998; Naik and Yadav 1998; Hansch et al. 1999; Chang et al. 2000) , on the trade publication regimes (Board and Sutcliffe 1995; Gemmill 1996; Saporta et al. 1999; , and on the liquidity of the market (Werner and Kleidon 1996; Menyah and Paudyal 1996; Draper and Paudyal 1997; Levin and Wright 1999; Menyah and Paudyal 2000; Huang and Stoll 2001) . The general consensus is that the London market is fairly competitive despite some of the market makers do not behave in a competitive way. The profits of market makers are small, and they even lose money on the trades with institutional investors.
Compared with the bulk of literature on SEAQ, relatively little work has been done on SETS era. Ellul (2000) compares the variances of prices on SETS and off SETS, and concludes that the former is bigger. He suggests that dealers in a hybrid system stabilize the price. Taylor et al. (2000) argue that the smaller spreads of SETS reduce the transaction costs of arbitragers in spot and future markets, and the prices in both markets adjust more quickly. Friederich and Payne (2002) Above all, the closest work to this paper is by Naik and Yadav (2003) . They examine 76 FTSE-100 stocks and their matching non-SETS stocks using pre- SETS (1994 and 1996) and SETS (1998) data. They show that SEAQ market makers stabilize the price especially in the early morning. They also show that inside spreads for the rest of the day in 1998 are lower than in pre-SETS era. A problem of their conclusion is the sample periods of their data are so far apart that something other than the introduction of SETS may contribute the reduction of spreads. Nevertheless, Naik and Yadav (2003) is complementary to this paper in that they investigate the change in liquidity in FTSE-100, the most liquid stocks on the Exchange, and this paper focuses on less liquid, FTSE-250 stocks.
Data
The data is Transactions Data Services (TDS) provided by the London Stock Exchange, which includes trades, quotes, orders, and best prices (quotes and orders) records.
The change took place on 6 September 1999. The sample is chosen six months before and after the change, and each of the six months is divided in to two periods. Therefore, denote the week starting on 6 September as the Week 1. From Week -25 to Week 0 is the pre-move period, and from Week 1 to Week 26 is the post-move period. Furthermore, divide the sample period into four sub-periods: Period 1 covers from 8 March till 4 June, Period 2 from 7 June till 3 September, Period 3 from 6 September till 3 December, and Period 4 from 6 December till 3 March.
The sample stocks are chosen among those traded in domestic SETS or SEAQ market whose ordinary shares have trade records in each month between March 1999 and March 2000. Except those stocks which moved from SEAQ to SETS on 6 September, the other stocks must have traded consistently either in SEAQ or SETS. In other words, a few stocks which moved from SEAQ to SETS during the sample period but not on 6 September are excluded from the analysis. Thus, there are three sub-samples: "MOVE" group consists of those which moved to SETS on 6 September, "SETS" group consists of those which trade in SETS during the sample period, and "SEAQ" group consists of those which always trade in SEAQ. Furthermore, the sample stocks must have no major corporate events during the sample period so that the shares are re-issued. This criteria excludes quite a few stocks, including seven stocks in the"MOVE"sample. 4 In the end, the sample consists of 40 "MOVE" stocks, 108 "SETS" stocks, and 705 "SEAQ" stocks.
The original sample contains more than sixteen million records, and a few filtering rules are used to re-shape the data. Firstly, we only include two types of trades: the SETS trades which went through the limit-order system, and the ordinary broker-dealer trades.
5 The Exchange provides various block-trade facilities for both SETS and SEAQ stocks, such as portfolio trades, protected trades, and trades with volume weighted average prices. Those trades are excluded from the analysis because their executions are fundamentally different from the trades in the main market. Secondly, trades outside the official trading hours are not included. The official hours are between 9:00 and 16:30 before 17 September, and between 8:00 and 16:30 after 20 September. During the trading hours, market makers in SEAQ are required to post two-way quotes, and orders are executed in SETS. Brokerdealers are free to trade outside the trading hours, but the trading volumes are small. Thirdly, those trades of which sensible effective spreads cannot be calculated are deleted, which occurs when either the best bid or the best ask price is missing, when the best bid price is no smaller than the best ask price, when the best bid (ask) price is ten times bigger or smaller than the mean of the best bid (ask) of the day, and when the trade prices are outside the prevailing inside quotes and their effective spreads are greater than 50%.
Finally, some of the trade records are merged and the prices are recalculated. A SEAQ trade is occasionally reported as multiple trades on the requests of investors, who may wish to do so for tax or other purposes.
6 Since those trades carry the same price and are executed at the same time, while the prices of the trades are determined at the same time, and they should be regarded as one trade. However, there is no flag in the data to indicate which trades should be grouped together, and those trades are identified and grouped if they were executed at the same time, by the same dealers of the same trade capacities, and with the same price and trading direction.
Furthermore, TDS reports multiple SETS trades when a later order marches several earlier orders, which makes a big market order trade incompatible with a dealer trade. Therefore, trades executed at the same time are merged into one trade if they are triggered by the same market order or the same marketable limit order.
For each stock in the "MOVE" sample, we try to find two matching stocks, one in "SETS" sample and the other in "SEAQ" sample. The group of the forty marching stocks from "SETS" sample is called "MATT" group, and the matching SEAQ group is called "MATQ" group. The matching groups will be used for specific tests, see the next few sections for details. The matching criteria is the trading volume before 6 September, and we adapt the methodology of Huang and Stoll (1996) by calculating
where N , V , S, are respectively the total number of trades, the pounds trading volumes, and the average trade size of the stock between 6 March and 5 September 1999, and c and m respectively indicate the "MOVE" and the "match" sample. We aim to minimize the sum of (1) for the matching pairs, which depends on the sequence of picking up matching stocks. However, to complete the permutation of matching "MOVE" sample with one hundred plus SETS stocks and seven hundred SEAQ stocks requires enormous amount of time. By examining the summary statistics, it appears that the average size, the number and the volumes of trades of "SETS" sample are bigger than those of "MOVE" sample, which are in turns bigger than those of "SEAQ" sample. Thus, matching smaller size, small number of trades, or small volumes of SETS stocks with the "MOVE" sample may yield small value of (1). The same reason applies for matching big size, big number of trades, and big volumes of SEAQ stocks with the "MOVE" sample. Our matching algorithm is therefore based on the above reasoning:
1. To match the "MOVE" sample with SEAQ stocks, start off with the stock with the biggest trading volumes in the "MOVE" sample to match with a SEAQ one which yield the smallest (1). Then find a SEAQ stock to match with the one with the second biggest volumes, with the third biggest volumes, and so one. Calculate the sum of (1) after all the pairs have been found.
2. Match "MOVE" sample with SEAQ stocks again. Start off this time with the biggest number of trades in the sample. Calculate the sum of (1).
3. Match "MOVE" sample with SEAQ stock by starting off with the biggest average trade size. Calculate the sum of (1).
4. Randomize the sequence of "MOVE" sample to match 5000 times. Calculate the sum of (1) and compare them with those obtained in the previous three steps. Choose the pairs with the smallest sum of (1).
To match "MOVE" sample with SETS stocks, we proceed a similar algorithm. The difference is that the stocks with the smallest trade size, the volumes and the number of trades are picked up to match first. We also randomize the sequence 5000 times to find if there is a better match. It turns out that the smallest sum of (1) took place in a randomized sequence, but its value is not very different from those obtained in the previous three steps. The names of the stocks and the matching SETS and SEAQ stocks are listed on Table 1 . Table 2 summarizes the trade data after filtering. The first row reports the statistics of the full sample, followed by the statistics from sub-samples, from the SETS or dealers, and from each sample period. For each row, the "aggregate" results the summations or the average of all of the trades in the group, and the "per stock average" results reports the simple average of the statistics of the stocks in that group.
The sample consists of more than 14 million trades with trading volume close to eight hundred billion pounds. Most than 70% of trades in the sample comes from "SETS" sample, which also account for nearly 87% of the trading volumes. In contrast, the 705-stock "SEAQ" sample accounts for 3.3 million trades and 72 billion pound volumes. "MATT" group is the next biggest sample, followed by "MOVE" group, the center of this analysis, and "MATQ" group.
Stocks in different samples exhibit very different liquidity. The average "SETS" stocks has 94,679 trades during the sample period. Divided by 251 trading days, there are about 377 trades per day. Its trading volumes is more than 6.3 billion pounds, which translates to 25 million pounds per day. On the other hand, there are only 4,709 trades with trading volumes of 103 million pounds for the average "SEAQ" sample, which translate to 19 trades and 411 thousands pounds volumes per day.
The "MOVE" sample lie in the middle of the two groups. Its number of trades, trading volumes, and the average trade size are all between its counterpart in "SETS" and "SEAQ" group. Moreover, the average stock of the matching sample "MATT" is less liquid than that of "SETS" group, from which it was selected, but it is more liquid than that of "MOVE" group. Similarly, the average "MATQ" stock is more liquid than the average "SEAQ" stock and less liquid than the average "MOVE" stock.
The table also reports the statistics of the trades by trading mechanisms. Most of the trades are executed by dealers, even for the stocks who may trade in SETS. The average trade size of SETS trade is bigger than the average dealer trades (unconditionally), which reflects the fact that the trade sizes of the stocks who are allowed to trade in SETS are bigger than those who are not. The latter section will show that SETS trades are generally smaller than dealer trades after controlling for stocks.
Finally, the table presents the summary of trades by each smaple period. It appears that the trading volumes are bigger in the latter periods. Table 3 reports order statistics. The statistics of the full sample are followed by those from the sub-samples. For the full sample and the subsamples, both aggregate and per stock results are reported. There are nearly 12 million orders in the sample, most of which belong to "SETS" group. The stocks in the "MOVE" sample did not trade in the order book until 6 September, and the number of orders are small compared with those in "SETS" and "MATT" sample. The aggregate average size is bigger than the per stock average size, especially in the "MOVE" and "SETS" sub-samples. This is due to a few stocks in the sub-samples with much more orders than average, and the average size of the orders are much larger than the average, which drives the aggregate average up.
The table also reports the numbers from buy orders and sell orders separately, but there is no big difference among them. The last part of the table reports the statistics by the type of the order. There are two types of "at best price" order: the "execute and eliminate" order is attached with a limit price, and the market order is not. The two types of orders only constitute around 8% of the total orders. "Fill or kill" order is similar to "execute and eliminate" order except that it does not allow partial execution, and there are very few investors submitting it. Limit order is the most popular type of order, which accounts for more than 91% of the total orders. Around 2.6 millions of the limit orders are marketable, which suggests that investors used to submit limit orders even if they are eager to trade. The average sizes of different types of orders vary a lot. The size of market order is bigger than 126 thousand pounds, whereas the that of "fill or kill" order is less than 29 thousand.
Finally, Table 4 reports statistics from quote data. There are more than 3.3 million quote records, of which the majority is from "SEAQ" sample. There are no quote for the "MOVE" group after the stocks move to SETS. However, their daily average quotes are 55.1, more than those in "SEAQ" and "MATT" group. The average quote size of "MOVE" group is also the largest. Furthermore, Stocks in "MOVE" group have on average 11 market makers, and those in "SEAQ" group only have 6.
Exploratory Analysis
Figure 1 plots Weekly average inside spreads as well as effective spreads. The inside spread of a stock traded in SETS is the difference between the limit prices of the best bid and best ask orders, divided by the midpoint of the two prices. Similarly, the inside spread of a stock in SEAQ is the difference between the best bid and best ask quote prices, divided by the midpoint of the two. The weekly average inside spread is the simple average of the daily spread, which is time-weighted average of the inside spreads during the official trading hours.
On the other hand, the effective spread is defined as two times the difference between traded price and the midpoint of the best bid and ask price, divided by the mid point. The weekly average effective spread is the simple average of the daily spread, which is the simple average of the effective spreads of the trades during the trading hours. The group average spread (as shown in the figure) is the simple average of the weekly spreads of the stocks in that group.
The top and the bottom graph of Figure 1 respectively plot the average inside spread and effective spread of the three main sub-samples against the time. Note that Week 1 started on 6 September 1999, when "MOVE" group began trading on the order book. The solid line indicates the spreads of "MOVE" group, and the dotted line and dash line represent the "SETS" and "SEAQ" group, respectively. Comparing the two graphs, the effective spread is about one half of the inside spread for the "SETS" group, about two-third of the inside spread for the "MOVE" group, and about three quarters for the "SEAQ" group.
However, the most astonishing part of the graphs is that the spreads for both the "MOVE" group and the "SETS" group peaked at Week 17, which was the week between Christmas and the New Year and when the Exchange opened only for two days (29 and 30 December). The spreads for the "SEAQ" group barely change at Week 17. How will one explain the big jump in spread at Week 17? Before answering this question, examine the next two figures.
Figure 2 plots number of trades, trading volumes, and average trade size of the sample. The weekly statistics is the simple average of the daily ones, which is the simple average of all of the trades during the day. Same as Figure 1 , the "MOVE" group, the "SETS" group and the "SEAQ" group are respectively represented by the solid, the dotted and the dash line.
The top-left graph shows the daily number of trades and the top-right graph shows the daily trading volumes. The patterns for the three groups are similar. The number of trades and trading volumes remain stable in the first two periods, and they mildly increase in the second period with sharp drops on Week 17. The sharp drops are also observable in the graph of average trade size, which is shown in the bottom-left of the figure. Apart from the drops, the average sizes of "SETS" and "SEAQ" group do not change much, where as that of "MOVE" group appears to fall in the second half of the sample period.
The liquidity in Week 17 clearly dried up; the spreads fell and the trading volumes were small. Were the price particularly volatile? The upper part of Figure 3 plots the average of daily standard deviation of 15-minute returns. The average standard deviation of "MOVE" group in Week 17 is the highest during the sample period, and that of "SETS" groups in Week 17 is a local maximum. However, the volatility of "SEAQ" group fell during the week.
Was trading at the end of the year too risky? The graph of adjusted daily closing FTSE-100 index in the lower part of the figure marks Week 17 with an arrow, 7 which shows that the index achieved its peak during the week. 8 It is likely that the market was inherently so risky that it became very illiquid.
7 The index data is retrieved from the web site of http:\\www.yahoo.Com. 8 The FTSE All-Shares Index also attended its peak in Week 17.
However, another equally probable explanation of the low liquidity of Week 17 is simply that many investors were away for the Millennium holiday. Note that average trade sizes dropped. If different sizes of trades carry different amount of information, it suggested that the level of informed trading was low during the week. Other things equal, the liquidity providers should not have worried about information asymmetry.
Whatever the source of illiquidity, the figures clearly expose the difficulty of a limit-order system, or rather, they demonstrate the advantages of SEAQ in coping with "difficult" times. SETS relies on limit-order investors to provide liquidity, and these investors are not present in the market all the time. When many of them are absent from the market, the spreads increase sharply. SEAQ, on the other hand, obliges market makers to be present in the market, and they do provide a stable service for the investors. In Week 17, the trading volumes dropped all over the market, but the spreads in SEAQ remained virtually unchanged.
To sum up, the figures shown above further suggest some drawbacks of moving the "MOVE" group from SEAQ to SETS. Not only are the inside and the effective spreads of the "MOVE" group more sensitive to the Week 17 episode than the "SETS" group, but its intraday volatility also increases sharply after moving to SETS, from well below the volatility of the "SETS" group to above, as shown in Figure 3 .
Formal analysis
This section presents the comparative and regression analysis regarding the move of the forty stocks from SEAQ to SETS. All of the investigations removed Week 17 data. Table 5 reports the average inside spreads. Similar to the definition in drawing Figure 1 , the table reports the average spreads of the sub-samples, which are the means of daily spreads, which are the time-average of inside spreads during trading hours. All the number are expressed in percentage points. Panel A reports the average spreads of the sub-samples as well as the average standard deviations in parentheses. The sub-sample MOVE and SETS exhibit the same pattern: the inside spreads barely change in the first two periods, and they increase in Period 3 and further in Period 4. The trend in SEAQ group, however, seems to be falling. Panel B tests the significance of the changes in inside spreads, CISP , between Period 2 and the subsequent periods:
Spreads
Inside spreads
where ISP s,t is the inside spread of stock s in Period t, t = 3, 4, and S is the number of stocks in the sub-sample. The changes of inside spreads in MOVE and SETS groups are substantial and statistically significant, and the change in SEAQ group is minor. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from the results reported above regarding the move of MOVE group to the order book. Its average inside spread increases dramatically, and so is the spread of SETS group. To obtain a clearer picture of the scale of the change, Panel C reports the difference of spreads between MOVE stocks and matching stocks:
where x = M AT T, M AT Q and t = 1, 2, 3, 4. Before moving to the order book, the spreads of MOVE stocks are on average 0.3 percent larger than those of MATT stocks and slightly smaller than those of MATQ stocks. After the move, the spread differences all become positive and larger. Panel D further tests the change of difference:
The changes are significantly positive for both groups in both periods, which indicates the inside spreads of MOVE group increase after moving to SETS. Table 6 reports the average daily effective spreads for each period and each sub-sample. The effective spread is twice the difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the best quotes or orders, expressed in percentage points. Panel A reports the average spreads their average standard deviations (in parentheses). The effective spreads are smaller than the inside spreads reported in Table 5 . Similar to what have been found in inside spreads, the effective spreads of MOVE group are flat before moving to SETS, and they increase a lot after the move. Those of SETS group also increase in Period 3 and especially so in Period 4, and those of SEAQ group do not change very much except it is the highest in Period 1. The change in effective spread of stock s in the later period t, CESP s,t , is defined as the average daily effective spread in the later period minus the spread in Period 2:
Effective spreads
where t = 3, 4. panel B reports the average CESP and the t-values in each sub-sample. The spread of MOVE group rises drastically, and that of SETS group also rises significantly. The spread of SEAQ group also rises despite that it is not statistically significant.
Furthermore, define the difference of effective spread between Period 2 and the subsequent period t as
where x = M AT T, M AT Q. Panel C presents the differences and the t-values (in parentheses). The spread of MOVE group is greater than that in MATT group and smaller than in MATQ group in the first two periods. The difference between MOVE group and MATT group gets wider in the subsequent periods, and the difference between MOVE and MATQ group becomes positive. The change of the difference between Period 2 and subsequent period t is defined as CDESP x = DESP Table 7 reports effective spreads separately by the trade size. For each stock, the trades in Period 1 and 2 are sorted into ten deciles. "Big" trades are those in the biggest three deciles, "small" trades are those in the smallest three deciles, and "medium" trades are those in the middle four deciles. To be consistent, the sizes of trades in Period 3 and 4 are also determined by the decile value in the earlier periods.
The panel reveals that smaller trades get bigger spreads in each subsamples in all periods except for Period 4 of SEAQ group, which is consistent with the findings in the literature. Furthermore, Table 6 shows that the effective spreads of MOVE and SETS group rise in Period 3 and Period 4. The Panel shows that the rise can be found in each size category, a phenomenon which is exposed more clearly in computing CESP in Panel B. However, closely examining the MOVE group reveals that CESP is biggest in small-size group and smallest in big-size group in both periods, while the difference among SETS size group is little. As far as SEAQ group is concerned, Table 6 reveals that the effective spread mildly increases, and this panel shows that the increase is in the big-size group, whereas the spread actually falls in the other two size groups.
The spread difference between MOVE group and the matching groups in each size category is reported in Table 8 . Panel A shows the spread differences and t-values. All of the differences in the size categories of MATT group monotonically increase from Period 1 to Period 4, and all of the differences of MATQ group changes from negative to positive as time goes by. Thus, the observed increase in spread difference in Panel C of Table 6 is not limited to any certain trade size.
Furthermore, Panel B compares spread difference between Period 2 and the subsequent periods. They are all positive and most of them are statistically significant. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 7 reports that the change of effective spread of MOVE group is biggest for the small-size category and smallest for the big-size category. The change of spread difference preserves this property: the big-size category experiences the smallest change, whereas the small-size category experiences the biggest.
Finally, Table 9 further classifies trade-size categories by the origin of the trade. Panel A reports the average effective spread in each category. Only the spreads of MOVE and SETS groups are reported as stocks in the two groups are allowed to traded in the order book or with dealers. Controlled for the trade size, the effective spreads of the order book are, in fact, not very different from those of dealer trades. panel B tests the spread difference between the two trade origins by subtracting dealer spreads from order-book spreads. Most of the differences are negative, that is, the spreads of the order book are smaller. The t-values of medium and small trades of SETS group are all significant. However, the difference of MOVE group is mixed. The spreads of dealer trades are smaller in the big-size category, and they are bigger in the medium-and the small-size category though the differences are not significant in most occasions.
Volumes
Number of trades
Panel A of Table 10 lists average number of trades of the sub-samples, which are the mean daily number of trades of the stocks in the groups. An average stock in SETS group trades much more frequently than a MOVE stock, which trades much more frequently than a stock in SEAQ group. However, the numbers of trades of the three groups appear to surge in the later two periods. Define T RADE x s,t as the average daily number of trades of stock s in group x in Period t, then the proportion of the change in the number of trades between Period 2 and Period t is defined as
Panel B shows average CT RADE for each sub-sample in Period 3 and Period 4. The trades of MOVE group increase by 55% from period 2 to Period 3, and by 154% to Period 4. The trades of SETS group increase even further by 195% in Period 4, and those of SEAQ group also increase a lot despite being dwarfed by the other two groups.
Panel C reports the difference of the average number of trades between stocks in MOVE group and their matching stocks:
DT RADE
M AT T , The average trade difference between MOVE and MATT group, is negative in all of the periods. DT RADE M AT T in Period 1 is −1.21, which means that the numbers of trades of matching SETS stocks are 1.21 times higher than the numbers of trades of MOVE stocks. However, the difference is shrinking in the later periods. As far as DT RADE M AT Q is concerned, it is positive and mildly increasing during the sample period. Panel D further presents the average of the change in DT RADE:
CDT RADE M AT T and CDT RADE M AT Q are all positive despite the latter is not statistically significant in both Period 3 and Period 4. Bringing the evidence together, it appears that the trades of all kinds of stocks increases during the sample period, and the increase in MOVE group is not very different from the other groups. Table 11 reports the number of shares traded during the sample period. The reason to use shares to measure trading volumes instead of Sterling is to avoid the possible distortion when the prices of the shares change greatly during the sample period. Panel A of the table shows daily number of shares traded for an average stock in each sub-sample. The number of shares appears to be increasing in all of the sub-samples. Define SHARE x s,t as the average daily number of shares of stock s in group x in Period t, then the proportion of the change in the number of trades between Period 2 and Period t is defined as CSHARE Table 10 . However, the comparison with matching firms shows another picture. Define the difference of the average number of shares between stocks in MOVE group and their matching stocks as Table 10 , DSHARE M AT T is negative. Different from Table 10, Three out of four CDSHARE are negative despite that the t-values are not significant. Therefore, the trading volumes of MOVE group do not increase as much as the matching groups. Table 12 presents the depths of the sample. The focus here is limited to the depths of the inside spreads. Panel A reports the average quote depth of SEAQ group during the sample period and of MOVE group in the first half of the period. The average quote depth is computed as follows. First, calculate time-weighted average of ask and bid depths separately during the trading hour of the day. The daily average depth is the average the ask and bid depths. Then average the daily depth to obtain the average depth of a stock, and finally average the depths across the stock to obtain the average depth reported in Panel A.
Shares
DSHARE x s,t = (SHARE M OV E s,t − SHARE x s,t )/SHARE M OV E s,t .
As in
Depths
Panel B reports the depths in the order book of SETS and MOVE group. The order depth is defined in a way similar to the quote depth. Although it is difficult to compare quote depths with order depths, the discrepancy between the quote depth and the order depth of MOVE group is nothing but huge. On the other hand, the quote depth of SEAQ group and the order depth of SETS group both exhibit mild increase during the sample period.
It is difficult to measure market depth, and focusing on the depth of inside spread is by no means perfect. The depth aims to measure the maximum trading volumes that do not change the price. The inside quote size may overestimate the depth. If an informed trader successfully trades with a market maker, the latter may swiftly shift the quote to avoid being hit at the best quote again. It means that the quote depth can be attained only if the investors contact all of the market makers posting the best quote and demand trading simultaneously, which rarely happens if it ever does.
Moreover, the order depth correctly measures the maximum volumes which do not change the price, but it overlook the fact that a dealer network runs parallel to the order book in London. Without the obligations of market makers, dealers still provide liquidity and are willing to match the best limit-order prices. The order depth underestimates the depth as a result.
Since the quote depth and the order depth have their own problems in measuring market, Panel C of the table complements the depth analysis by presenting the average trade size of the sub-samples. After all, investors must take the market depth into account so that the trade size is positively related to the depth. The panel shows that the depth in SETS group is deeper than in MOVE group, which is deeper than in SEAQ group. The average size is bigger than the order depth in Panel B, and smaller than the quote depth in Panel A, which is consistent with the conjecture that the order depth underestimates the market depth and the quote depth overestimates it.
However, the average trade size does not change very much over time. Denote T SIZE 
Intraday volatilities
Panel A of Table 13 presents the average standard deviations (in percentage points) of fifteen-minute returns during trading hours. The daily standard deviations are firstly calculated, and the standard deviations are averaged within the sample sub-periods and then across the stocks of the sub-samples. In the first two periods, the average standard deviation is the highest in SETS group and lowest in SEAQ group. In the later periods, the volatility of MOVE group shoot up to overtake SETS group, while SEAQ group remains at the bottom despite of the slightly increase in volatility.
Define the change in standard deviations as
, where ST D x s,t is the average daily standard deviation of stock s in group x in Period t. CST D is reported in Panel B. The volatility increases in the later periods in all of the sub-samples, but the increase in MOVE group is much greater than the other two groups. The increase can also be illustrated by comparing the volatility of MOVE group with its matching groups:
The difference in volatility is shown in Panel C. The standard deviation of MOVE group is smaller than MATT group by 0.32 percentage point, and it is the same as MATQ group in the first two periods. However, the difference with MATT group shrinks to nearly zero to the subsequent periods, while the difference with MATQ group increase dramatically. Panel D presents the changes in the difference:
The change in volatility is positive for both groups, that is, relative to the matching groups, the volatility of MOVE group increases after the stocks move to SETS.
Regression models
To investigate whether the changes in trading characteristics of MOVE stocks can be attributed to the move to SETS, a series of cross-sectional regressions are conducted. The regression sample consists of the 120 stocks with 40 each in MOVE, MATT and MATQ group. The dependent variables are some of the variables of interest in the previous sections, namely, CTSP s,t , CESP s,t , CTRADE s,t , and CSTD s,t , where t = 3, 4. The four variables are chosen because compared with other variables, they experience larger changes during the sample periods.
The independent variables are TSP s,1 , ESP s,1 , TSIZE s,1 , TRADE s,1 , and STD s,1 defined in previous sections. The reason to use the variable in Period 1 instead of Period 2 is an attempt to reduce the spurious correlation between dependent and independent variables. In addition, two dummy variables are introduced: MATT s equals one if the stock is in MATT group and zero otherwise, and MOVE s equals one if the stock is in MOVE group and zero otherwise.
The purpose of the regression exercises is to examine whether the changes in the variables of interest are related to the sub-samples to which the stocks belong, after controlling the stock characteristics in the previous period. Of all the independent variables, only TSP and ESP are highly correlated, 9 and they do not appear in one model at the same time. Moreover, the use of TSP and ESP does not affect the results of the regressions when dependent variables are CBAR and CSTD, and only the results of TSP are reported. Table 14 reports the regression results when t = 3. For each dependent variable, two model specifications are reported: one with dummy variables of sub-samples and one without. The results are striking. Only MOVE dummy is significant in explaining all of the dependent variables. MATT dummy is often not significant and the sign is different. Because both MOVE group and MATT group are in the order book in Period 3, the contrast of the performance of the two dummies imply that being in the order book per se does not change the stock characteristics in a significant way. Instead, it is the move from SEAQ to SETS that creates the change. The insignificance of MATT dummy means that the change of the stock characteristics of MATT group is similar to those of MATQ group.
Some of the variables discussed in the previous section are successful in explaining the dependent variables of some models, for example, TSP s,1 (ESP s,1 ) explains CTSP s,3 (CESP s,3 ) well. Most of the variables are not significant, and even TSP do not explain CBAR or CSTD. The exception is the intercept, which is significant in all but one models. However, the significance of the intercept is eroding once two dummy variables are added in the model, which implies that what cannot be explained by the control variables is partly explained by the dummies. Furthermore, the adjusted R 2 of the models are listed in the bottom of the table. Adding dummy variables into the model increases R 2 substantially. The increase is between 0.10 (of CESP) and 0.48 (of CSTD). Table 15 reports the regression results when t = 4 and it presents a similar picture as in Table 14 . The influence of control variables dwindles, and the SETS dummy is still insignificant. Most of all, MOVE dummy remains to be significant in explaining all of the dependent variables, the signs of the coefficients of MOVE dummy are the same as in Table 14 , and adding the dummy variables into the model increases the adjusted R 2 and reduces the significance of the intercept reduces. Therefore, the evidence in the two sets of regression models strongly suggests that the move from SEAQ to SETS change the trading characteristics of MOVE stocks profoundly.
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Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the liquidity of 40 FTSE-250 stocks six months before and after they started trading in SETS. The analysis reveals that after they moved to SETS, the inside spreads and effective spreads increased, the trading volumes seemed to be unchanged despite the increase in the number of trades, the depth appeared to fall, and the intraday volatility increased. These results were obtained by comparing those stocks with matching stocks and with a larger sample.
Moreover, the cross-sectional regression study of MOVE stocks and the matching stocks reveal that the liquidity characteristics before the move cannot explain the change in liquidity. The most important variable in the regressions turns out to be the dummy variable which indicates which stock belongs to MOVE group. The regression analysis and the comparative analysis are conducted after the end-of-millennium data are removed. The millennium evidence, however, is an embarrassing experience for SETS while a victory for SEAQ.
All the evidence points to one direction, which is that the limit order book does not create liquidity: it cannot live without liquidity. The regulator should think twice before implementing the limit-order system on everything. 
